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Leaning Right and Learning from the Left: Diﬀusion of
Corporate Tax Policy in the OECD
Abstract
There is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of
national governments are dependent on choices made by governments in other countries. We argue
that while the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diﬀusion
or competition, in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear. In
this paper we build a model of social learning with a speciﬁc application to the diﬀusion of corporate
tax reductions. This model yields predictions that are diﬀerentiable from existing models of tax
competition. Speciﬁcally, we argue that social learning is most likely to take place in the wake of
tax policy cuts by left governments. We test this model using an existing data set of corporate tax
rate changes and an author-created data set of changes in tax legislation, covering twenty OECD
countries from 1980-1998.Leaning Right and Learning from the Left: Diﬀusion of
Corporate Tax Policy in the OECD
There is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how (policy)
choices of governments are interdependent. Countries’ trade policy decisions are often conditional
on the tariﬀ rates and subsidy levels other countries. Scholars of monetary policy have often
lamented periods of “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies where countries use currency devaluations to
gain advantages over their trading partners. Neo-liberal economic reforms, including privatization
and pension reform, spread across countries in waves.
In this paper, we address the growing literature on policy competition in the area of corporate
taxation. Both domestically and internationally, corporate tax policy has emerged as a contentious
issue. Domestically, traditional supporters of corporate tax policy reductions on the right have,
in many cases, been joined by the left in pushing for corporate tax reduction as a mechanism for
job creation. In some cases, this is directly in response to corporate tax policy elsewhere in the
world, for example, when corporate tax reductions in the U.S. under President Reagan seemingly
triggered major tax reductions around the world.
We argue that while the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as
either diﬀusion or competition, in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels
are unclear. In the context of corporate tax policy, numerous scholars label the temporal clusters of
tax policy cuts as evidence for tax policy competition. Yet, we believe that a number of potential
theoretical mechanisms could explain this relationship. Empirically, we argue that the predic-
tions generated by studies of corporate tax policy competition are in many cases observationally
equivalent to models of social learning.
In this paper, we build a model of social learning and contrast it with existing models of corpo-
rate tax competition. The model provides us with comparative statics that allow us to empirically
diﬀerentiate our explanation for clustered tax policy cuts from existing models of tax policy com-
petition. Speciﬁcally, while models of tax policy competition focus on the role of large countries or
competitors for investment as triggers of tax policy diﬀusion, we focus on the potential for learn-
ing, when a government with long-held preferences for higher corporate taxes (left governments)
legislates corporate tax reductions. As a result, our social learning model yields empirical predic-
1tions that are clearly distinguishable from existing models of tax competition. We stress that it is
possible that multiple channels of diﬀusion can aﬀect corporate tax decisions, where social learning
is not mutually exclusive from these other forms of diﬀusion. Yet our goal is to construct a social
learning model and a set of empirical tests that allow us to diﬀerentiate social learning from existing
scholarship on corporate tax competition.
We test the model using an existing data set of tax policy rates from Basinger and Hallerberg
(2004) and a unique, author-created data set on the timing of tax policy cuts in twenty OECD
countries from 1980-1998. Our empirical results point to the importance of social learning in the
diﬀusion of corporate tax policy. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that tax cuts by left governments lead to
changes in the tax policies of other governments.
This project makes two major contributions to political science scholarship. First, it directly
addresses the determinants of corporate tax policy cuts in the OECD. Contrary to existing studies
that mostly link corporate tax reductions to tax competition, we ﬁnd evidence consistent with social
learning. Second, this paper makes a broader contribution to literatures in international relations
and comparative politics. We outline a number of important substantive debates in international
political economy and comparative politics that could apply and empirically test theories of learning,
emulation and innovation, which traditionally have been under-utilized in political science.
1 Diﬀusion, Learning and Competition in the Global Economy
There is a growing recognition that the actions of one actor aﬀect the actions of other actors,
whether these are sub-national actors (e.g., states, provinces, etc.), groups within a society (e.g.,
political parties, insurgent military groups, etc.) or nation-states.1 Speciﬁcally, studies of how
policy and preferences diﬀuse across borders have become an important part of the scholarship
in political science (for a review, see Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006). As pointed out by
Elkins and Simmons, “since 1950, ﬁfteen to twenty titles with diﬀusion appear each decade until
the 1990s, when the number spikes to thirty-seven” (Elkins and Simmons, 2005, p. 36). While
1See Knill (2005) for a review of policy convergence in the European Union, Gilardi (2005) on
the diﬀusion of independent regulatory agencies and Meseguer (2005) for an excellent discussion of
diﬀusion and rational learning in regulatory policies.
2numerous research projects across diﬀerent subﬁelds have studied diﬀusion, we focus on reviewing
the literature in international and comparative political economy, with a speciﬁc focus on corporate
tax policy making in the OECD.
Terms such as diﬀusion, learning, competition and imitation are often used in political science,
yet often the exact meaning of these concepts is either not deﬁned or consistent with a number
of diﬀerent concepts. Recent contributions have made progress in reﬁning these concepts, such as
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006), who diﬀerentiate between coercion, competitive pressures
from market forces, policy learning and social emulation.2 Quinn and Toyoda (2007) examine
how domestic and international factors aﬀect changes in international capital account regulation.
Volden, Ting and Carpenter (2008) build theoretical models that allow us to diﬀerentiate between
situations in which governments learn from their own experiences and those where governments
learn from the experiences of other governments. Drawing on a sociological approach, Lee and
Strang (2006) argue that “interpretive frames” help explain the diﬀusion of public sector downsiz-
ing.3 We argue that even with the advances in the diﬀusion literature, there is considerable room
for both reﬁnement and theory building, in order to improve on empirically diﬀerentiating between
diﬀerent forms of diﬀusion.
To give one example, research on the spread of neo-liberal reforms across countries, including the
privatization of state-run enterprises, has considered diﬀusion as an important component of these
policy reforms (see Meseguer, 2004).4 If one examines the data on privatization, there is a clear
pattern of temporally clustered privatization across countries, with waves of Eastern European and
Latin American countries engaging in privatization at the same time. One argument is that these
2Elkins and Simmons (2005) mention six mechanisms by which diﬀusion can take place: learning,
imitation, bandwagoning, emulation, mimicry and competition.
3This argument on interpretative frames is broadly related to our social learning approach, yet
with important diﬀerences. Our learning model focuses on how the partisanship of governments
facilitates learning, while Lee and Strang argue that speciﬁc countries, sometimes referred to as
pioneers, serve as leaders in policy change.
4See also Henisz, Zelner and Guill´ en (2005) for a discussion of diﬀerent theories on the diﬀusion
of infrastructure reforms.
3countries could all be subject to common external shocks, such as budget crises or the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Yet, while international factors obviously aﬀect these privatization decisions, a
direct relationship between, say, Hungary and Poland’s decision to privatize could be absent.
Unfortunately, this pattern of diﬀusion is also consistent with a number of other theories. First,
many countries were subject to structural adjustment programs or attempting to gain membership
to international institutions (e.g., WTO, EU, etc.).5 These patterns of privatization may be closer
to coercion than diﬀusion (for an example, see Drezner, 2005). Second, there have been major
shifts in economists’ views on the proper way of economic regulation, so that these similar policy
changes across countries could be the result of Chicago-trained economists and the Washington
Consensus (see Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003).
Another example is the interdependence of exchange rate policies. While there is a large litera-
ture on the domestic factors that aﬀect exchange rates, there is evidence that competitive dynamics
inﬂuence exchange rate policies.6 One argument is that exchange rates aﬀect trade ﬂows, in that
countries’ devaluations aﬀect the prices of imports and exports. In periods of “beggar-thy-neighbor”
exchange rate cuts, countries engage in exchange rate devaluation in response to other countries’
devaluations (see Eichengreen, 1996).
Yet, there are also changes in exchange rate choices that seem to be independent of this com-
petitive dynamic and, instead, based on learning from other countries. Some examples include the
spread of independent central banks, ﬁxed exchange rates or currency boards.7 Without going into
the details of these arrangements, there is considerable evidence that these major policy changes
5See Vreeland (2003) for a nuanced view on IMF conditionality. See Brune, Garrett and Kogut
(2004) for an examination of how IMF conditionality inﬂuences the prices investors are willing to
pay for privatized assets and Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) on the constraining impact of IMF
programs on domestic spending choices.
6For selected studies on the political economy of exchange rates and monetary policy, see Sim-
mons (1994), Bernhard and Leblang (1999), Bernhard and Leblang (2006), Bernhard, Broz and
Clark (2002), Frieden (1991), Frieden (2002) and Bearce (2007).
7See Frieden and Stein (2001) for a review of exchange rate policy in Latin America.
4were spread through the diﬀusion of knowledge across countries.8
More generally, we can say that in many areas of international and comparative political econ-
omy research has shown temporally or spatially clustered policy changes, yet this empirical regu-
larity is consistent with models of learning, competition or diﬀusion. While we know that “inter-
national” factors inﬂuence the decisions of policy makers, we are still left with considerable gaps in
our understanding of the exact mechanisms underpinning this diﬀusion. Does globalization “force”
governments into policy change or does it allow governments to learn best practices from other
governments, resulting in better domestic policy decisions?9
In this paper we address an important substantive question on the setting of corporate tax rates.
Some scholars have argued for a “race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates (see Andrews, 1994;
Cerny, 1990; Kurzer, 1993). A race to the bottom could lead to social tension, as citizens demand
higher levels of social protection at a time when the government is the most ﬁscally constrained to
provide these protections (see Rodrik, 1997). Recent scholarship has provided a much more nuanced
view of tax “competition” across countries. Three prominent studies are worth mentioning.
First, Swank and Steimo (2002) identify major adjustments in the levels of statutory corporate
tax rates, where numerous countries slashed corporate tax rates in the wake of major tax cuts in the
United States in 1986 (see also Swank, 2006). According to Swank and Steimo, despite the fact that
these tax cuts were the result of competition over mobile capital with the U.S., most countries, while
lowering tax rates, also eliminated numerous industry and ﬁrm speciﬁc tax exemptions. Thus, while
corporate tax rates fell, more ﬁrms were subject to corporate taxes. As a result, rate reductions
had little impact on the revenues generated through corporate taxation. Although the statutory
tax rates have decreased, there has been a “remarkable stability in the levels and distribution of
tax burdens” (Swank and Steimo, 2002, p. 642).
Hays (2003) examines the convergence of corporate tax rates in the OECD. He builds a the-
oretical model of corporate tax rate decisions in which competition for capital can lead to tax
8There is also a rich literature on the diﬀusion of ﬁnancial crises (e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart,
2000).
9These questions are quite similar to debates on the relationship between federalism and gover-
nance (Oates, 1999).
5convergence. Yet, the simplistic view of tax policy as a race to the bottom is misguided. Hays
ﬁnds that the majoritarian, liberal democracies are the countries most aﬀected by the competition
for international capital. Hays’s work provides an excellent theoretical exploration of how domestic
political institutions mitigate the eﬀects of tax competition.
Finally, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) present an inﬂuential article on corporate tax com-
petition. They develop a tournament model of competition in which countries bid against other
countries for investment. They argue that the tax rate determinants are greatly inﬂuenced by
domestic politics, including levels of partisanship and veto players, which can limit tax policy cuts.
Empirically, they ﬁnd strong evidence for corporate tax competition, yet domestic political factors
still heavily inﬂuence policy choices.
While we believe that these studies all provide important insights into tax policy competition,
important elements remain unexplored. In this project we make a number of explicit assumptions
that allow us to diﬀerentiate learning from these models of corporate tax competition. The ﬁrst of
these assumptions is rather uncontroversial and one that is common in the literature. We assume
that it is more politically costly for left governments to cut corporate taxes (see for example
Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004). Ceteris paribus, we would be more likely to observe tax cuts by
right governments than governments of the left.
A second assumption, less common in the literature, is that governments are operating in an
environment of imperfect information with regard to the elasticity of capital to taxes.10 In other
words, politicians have imperfect information on how investment will ﬂuctuate with changes in
corporate taxation. We argue that while governments may know that reductions in taxation will
increase capital ﬂows, there is uncertainty on the exact magnitude of these responses. We believe
that this is a realistic assumption, which is supported by both theoretical and empirical studies of
investment responses to taxation. In the following paragraph we brieﬂy review this literature.
Theoretically, while many scholars make the assumption that investors simply respond to after
tax rates of return, the literature on the determinants of multinational investment decisions (for-
10While the elasticity of capital to taxation is negative, in our discussion of the models we refer
to the elasticity of capital to tax reductions. Thus we expect a positive elasticity between tax
reductions and capital inﬂows.
6eign direct investment or FDI) is much more complicated. These multinational investors behave
quite diﬀerently from other forms of capital (Hymer, 1976), in that this type of investment is a
response to market failures, diﬀerent industry level factors or ﬁrm-speciﬁc reasons for making in-
vestments.11 Providing another level of complication, non-economic factors can also greatly aﬀect
foreign investment decisions. A recent article by Kiymaz and Taylor makes an explicit assumption
of uncertainty, according to which “hosts cannot be sure of how much to oﬀer the ﬁrm to locate
in its borders, largely because it cannot precisely estimate the political, social, and cultural costs
that the ﬁrm would face in foreign production” (Kiymaz and Taylor, 2000, p. 55). Consequently,
the simple assumption of capital ﬂowing to the countries with the highest after tax rate of return
is not supported by the theoretical literature on foreign direct investment.
Equally problematic for the assumption of perfect information on the elasticity of capital are
the complex ﬁndings of the empirical literature linking taxation and foreign direct investment (see
Jensen, 2006). Numerous scholars in the economics and management literatures have found that
corporate tax rates can impact certain types of investment decisions (e.g. in manufacturing). In
a comprehensive review of the literature, Hines (1999) explores the time-series and cross-sectional
analyses of the importance of tax rates for U.S. FDI outﬂows and foreign ﬂows of FDI into the U.S.
While several studies reviewed by Hines ﬁnd that taxes are not signiﬁcant determinants of FDI
inﬂows or outﬂows, a number of other studies ﬁnd that national tax rates do have a substantial
inﬂuence on FDI inﬂows, with elasticities ranging from −0.6 to −2.8.12 Devereux and Griﬃth (1998)
ﬁnd that average eﬀective tax rates are an important determinant of FDI decisions. Devereux,
Lockwood and Redoano (2008) build a sophisticated model of corporate tax policy setting, taking
into account both the statutory tax rate and the eﬀective marginal tax rate. This results in
“two-dimensional tax competition” where statutory rates aﬀect the location of proﬁts and eﬀective
11Many of the models based on market imperfections ﬁnd that tax rates are a minor determinant
of FDI inﬂows (Markusen, 1995).
12Altshuler, Grubert and Newton (2001) estimate the eﬀect of tax rates on U.S. manufacturing
investment in 1984 and 1992. They ﬁnd that tax rates have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on multinational
investments, and that this relationship has grown stronger over time (with an elasticity of 1.5 in
1984 and an elasticity of 3.0 in 1992).
7marginal rates the location of production. In one of the more recent and most comprehensive
studies, Mutti (2003) ﬁnds that corporate tax rates have a strong inﬂuence on the decisions of
manufacturing multinationals. According to his ﬁndings, a 1% decrease in the cost of capital leads
to a 3% increase in MNE production. The catch is, as Mutti states it, that “such a high response
does not apply if the output is destined for local markets, or if the country has high per capita
income” (Mutti, 2003, p. 5). Thus, there remains considerable disagreement on the impact of taxes
on foreign direct investment (see De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003).
Theoretically, this uncertainty could lead governments to “experiment” with tax reductions,
cutting corporate taxes and then examining how FDI responds to tax cuts. Alternatively, gov-
ernments could learn from the tax experiences of others by observing how FDI responds to tax
reductions in other countries (see Volden, Ting and Carpenter, 2008; Baturo and Gray, 2009).
Unfortunately for governments, the volatility of FDI ﬂows makes a simple before and after tax cut
comparison of FDI problematic even for well-trained scholars. As highlighted above, there is con-
siderable disagreement on the relationship between taxes and FDI in the academic community. As
a result, there is limited ability for “learning by doing” or simply observing the tax policy reforms
and FDI responses in other countries. Our model focuses on learning from the tax policy decisions
of other countries, allowing governments to observe policy changes by other governments before
making their own tax policy decisions.
It is important to note that our social learning model does not negate the possibility of other
forms of diﬀusion. To give an example from academia, Ph.D. programs may make changes to their
graduate curriculum due to competition with other programs, learning from doing, and emulating
best practices of other programs. It is plausible that all of these mechanisms are present and are
mutually reinforcing. Our goal in this paper is not to argue against other forms of diﬀusion, rather
our focus is to build a social learning model that explains corporate tax setting. Our empirical
identiﬁcation strategy is to diﬀerentiate our model of social learning from alternative diﬀusion
mechanisms. While these other mechanisms certainly may inﬂuence corporate tax setting, we
argue that our hypothesized patterns of statutory corporate tax reductions is consistent with our
social learning model and is inconsistent with arguments on common shocks or tax competition.
In the following section we outline a model of social learning from the tax policy choices of other
governments, not the response of FDI to taxation. Assuming imperfect information, we construct
8a learning model that is distinguishable from existing models of tax competition. We believe that
our model further contributes to our understanding of tax policy diﬀusion and has numerous other
applications outside of political science.
2 Biased Learning and Globalization
In this paper we focus on the diﬀusion of tax policy across OECD countries. Diﬀusion theory
has experienced a revival in recent years in political science, as evidenced by a growing number of
articles, and has been usefully employed in a number of diﬀerent contexts to understand the process
by which ideas, practices and policies make their way across local, state and national boundaries
(e.g. Berry and Baybeck, 1990, 2005; Boehmke and Witmer, 2004; Quinn and Toyoda, 2007; Elkins
and Simmons, 2005; Shipan and Volden, 2006; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006; Volden, 2006;
Volden, Ting and Carpenter, 2008). Here, we combine two until now separate approaches to suggest
a new mechanism by which diﬀusion can occur. The ﬁrst part of our theoretical approach is rooted
in the social learning strand of diﬀusion theory. The second part is taken from the theoretical work
on the usefulness of biased advice (Calvert, 1985). From the combination of these two approaches
emerges an innovative theory of diﬀusion that yields interesting new and plausible predictions,
which we test with cross-national data on corporate tax cuts.
We begin by discussing the two components of our theoretical approach and then explain how
these two approaches can be combined to further our understanding of national (tax) policymaking.
The ﬁrst approach goes under various names, but social learning is probably the most widely used
and most descriptive among them. Common to all social learning approaches is the idea of “pure
informational externalities” (Gale, 1996). This means that individuals can learn from each other’s
behavior, but their payoﬀs are not aﬀected by the actions of the other individuals. In our context,
tax policy changes in one country may not directly inﬂuence the level of FDI inﬂows into another
country, but they can provide information on the relationship between taxes and FDI inﬂows.
We note that our theoretical model explicitly assumes that competitive dynamics (i.e. payoﬀ
externalities) are absent. A comprehensive theoretical model from which both competition and
learning can emerge is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we merely suggest an alternative
to the many models of competition in order to derive predictions about the circumstances and
9observable implications of learning.13 In our empirical analysis, we test the predictions of our
learning model against those of the competition models. While, as a result, we have a competing
theories setup, we point out that our argument is not to be understood as an attempt to refute
the existence of competitive dynamics. Rather, it is meant as an existence proof, aimed at showing
that even in environments and circumstances commonly perceived to be purely competitive, there
is room for learning.
Here, we focus on a particular class of social learning models that has been referred to as
cascade or herding models (hereafter, simply referred to as cascade models). In the typical cascade
model, individuals receive a private signal, for instance, on the viability of corporate tax cuts, and
then are presented with a binary choice, i.e. to cut the corporate tax rate or not (e.g. Banerjee,
1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992, 1998). In the most basic version of the model,
individuals choose sequentially, with the order determined exogenously. The model generates two
key ﬁndings. First, individuals take into consideration the actions of earlier individuals. Second,
the use of information tends to be ineﬃcient. The ﬁrst point is rather obvious. The second point,
however, requires additional elaboration.
Why would the use of information be ineﬃcient? The reason is that very early on in the
sequence, individuals will start disregarding their personal information in favor of the information
conveyed by the actions of individuals earlier in the sequence. Simply stated - for the tax policy
case - assume government D has observed several other governments, call them A, B and C, cutting
their corporate tax rates. Moreover, assume that government D has private information indicating
13As we reviewed earlier, Hays (2003) and Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) are two prominent
political science contributions that construct formal models of tax competition and also include
domestic politics. There is also a rich literature in economics on tax policy competition. Wilson and
Wildasin (2004) reviews this literature and explores the normative implications of tax competition.
As cited earlier, one of the most sophisticated contributions is Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano
(2008), where the authors not only model the location decisions of ﬁrms, but also the ability of
ﬁrms to shift proﬁts via transfer pricing. Thus governments are in competition for both investment
and tax revenues. Recent contributions have also focused on ﬁrm-speciﬁc taxes (or subsidies). See
King, McAfee and Welling (1993) and Han and Leach (2008).
10that cutting the corporate tax rate might not be the best policy but feels pressured by the other
governments’ tax cuts to follow suit. Then government E, who is still waiting to make a decision, is
in the same position as government D, having learned nothing new from the action of government
D. This theoretical approach can be used to explain market bubbles and even provide insights into
fashion fads.
We apply the general idea of cascade models to the question of how national governments make
tax policy decisions in a globalized world. We believe that the basic dynamic of cascade models
applies to national governments’ tax decisions, but with additional twists, some of which have been
discussed in the existing literature and one of which, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been
considered in the context of cascade models. As a starting point, take the social learning model
due to Lohmann (1994). She applies a variation of the cascade model to the study of the East
German revolution in 1989.
What sets Lohmann’s approach apart from earlier cascade models is her focus on the ideology
of the demonstrators. She suggests that the Leipzig demonstrations were actually successful at
disseminating information about the East German regime, and that this success, in great part, has
to be attributed to the turnout of ideological moderates (those who were neither particularly critical
nor particularly sympathetic to the communist regime). The logic underlying this conclusion is that
the participation of moderates in the demonstrations sent a signal to potential future participants
that the demonstrations were not just a gathering of the ideological fringes, but rather a legitimate
form of protest against an ill-behaving regime. Lohmann goes beyond previous cascade models by
saying that it is not just important how many people show up, but also who shows up.14
We argue that this notion of ideology is crucial for understanding national governments’ tax
policy decisions. However, we depart from Lohmann’s model in one important respect: We argue
that it is not so-called moderates, as in the context of social movements, but “opposing extremists”
14In a sense, including the notion of ideology in the model allows for what Banerjee (1992) has
referred to as invertibility, which means that individuals later in the sequence can, at least partially,
infer the signals received by early movers. While Banerjee claims that invertibility eliminates herd
externalities, we would argue that they would only be completely eliminated if invertibility were
perfect, which in Lohmann’s story as well as in our story is not the case.
11that are crucial to social learning in international politics. This is where the second part of our
theoretical approach comes into play - the theory of biased advisors (Calvert, 1985). Calvert
formally models a situation where a decision maker is seeking advice from an expert. Using a
straightforward expected utility model, he shows that if a decision maker is strongly favoring a
particular policy, then he is better oﬀ seeking advice from a biased advisor that has the same
predisposition than seeking advice from an objective advisor (not to speak of an adviser biased
in the opposite direction). The logic underlying this initially counterintuitive result is that the
objective advisor is less likely to make the decision maker change his mind (because of the decision
maker’s previous predisposition), while advice from a biased advisor can have an impact: The biased
advisor, who has the same ideological predisposition as the decision maker, would only suggest a
policy contrary to that predisposition, if he thought that it was superior to the alternative(s).
While Calvert’s model is about the relationship between a policy maker and an advisor, we
are concerned with policy diﬀusion across governments. However, Calvert’s model still has clear
implications for diﬀusion in international politics.15 We show that one national government can, at
least under certain circumstances, infer information about another government’s domestic policy-
making process and use that information to devise its own policy. Take the example of a left
government that adopts a conservative policy. Other governments, both left and right, who observe
the ﬁrst government, can infer from this that the left government must have obtained new and
credible information. Why else would the left government have changed its policy stance? Of
course, the same story could be told about a right government adopting a liberal policy.
In sum, we argue that Calvert’s biased adviser model has implications for international politics,
15We should note that while there are important similarities between our model and that of
Calvert, the reader should know that Calvert’s model focuses on how individuals process information
given their own biases and the information biases of their advisors. Our model, while similar in
intuition, focuses on actors with diverging partisan preferences for tax policy cuts. We believe that
the implications of using either information biases (say towards tax cuts) or preferences (for tax
cuts) would be similar. However, we prefer to focus on diverging preferences over tax policy, as it
seems more realistic in our context and better ﬁts into the existing work on the political economy
of corporate taxation.
12in that governments who reverse long-held policy positions facilitate social learning and diﬀusion
across countries. In the cascade literature, such governments would be referred to as fashion leaders.
What is interesting about this model is that by adding an international level to Calvert’s biased
advisor story, Calvert’s result is expanded (assuming that his logic applies to the domestic level).
Combining the cascade model with the biased advisor model (in relation to domestic policy-
making) and applying the modiﬁed theory to our question about national governments’ tax policy
positions yields the following story line. When it comes to cutting taxes in general and corporate
taxes in particular, right governments are predisposed to a policy of lowering taxes, while left
governments are predisposed to maintaining or even increasing existing tax levels. Given the
uncertain role of corporate taxes in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), both right and
left governments would like to learn from the behavior of other governments about the feasibility
of cutting corporate taxes in attracting FDI, i.e. about the elasticity of FDI to corporate taxes.
While very little is learned about capital elasticity from tax cuts by right governments, tax cuts
by left governments provide a credible signal that capital responds to tax policy cuts.16 This
conclusion stems from the following facts: Tax cuts are very costly for left governments, whose
core constituencies oppose them, and politically advantageous for right governments, whose core
constituencies are in support of tax cuts and smaller government. In the following paragraphs, we
discuss the merits of this argument about partisan objective functions.
The existing literature on tax competition uses a number of diﬀerent models, yet many of them
share a core set of assumptions. The goal of our project is to explain the diﬀusion of tax policy
changes across countries, contrasting learning with existing models of competition. At the core
of our model is a simple assumption that is grounded in the political economy literature on tax
policy: We assume that left governments have preferences for higher levels of corporate taxation.
We justify this assumption below.
The numerous works in the public ﬁnance literature assume that politicians represent the inter-
est of the representative household, where governments provide public goods through taxation. In
16On the issue of credibility in cascade models, see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998).
See also the discussion of the legitimation concept from sociological organization theory in Lieber-
man and Asaba (2006).
13most of these models all residents are identical and thus have identical preferences over tax policy
(or levels of public goods). One potential extension of these models is to assume at least two types
of households, those endowed with capital and those endowed with labor. We can then derive their
preferences on the level of taxation, and allow political parties to represent these diﬀerent factors.
We favor a more direct approach, one that is exhibited in the work of Basinger and Hallerberg
(2004). They model competition for capital, assuming that governments beneﬁt from attracting
mobile capital, but with diﬀerent governments incurring diﬀerent costs of enacting tax policy re-
forms. Right governments have lower costs of cutting corporate taxes and are more likely to enact
corporate tax cuts, ceteris paribus, than left governments (Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004, Proposi-
tion 1, p. 264). This assumption is central to our theory. The fact that right and left governments
have diﬀerent preferences on taxation is often the very deﬁnition of right and left government.17
Building on this simple assumption and an imperfect information environment, we show how par-
tisanship can facilitate learning. Speciﬁcally, tax cuts by left governments reveal more information
about the state of the world than tax cuts by right governments.
We note that our model is consistent with a number of variations of politicians’ objective
functions. For example, Garrett (1998) argues that left governments have strong preferences for
redistribution, which leads to higher levels of capital taxation. Becker (1983) and Hays (2003) argue
that the left and right governments have diﬀerent constituencies, i.e. shareholders or wage earners,
leading the left (representing wage earners) to have preferences for higher levels of taxation.18 Swank
suggests that right-of-center governments’ electoral success can facilitate reform, where “extended
right-party government will bolster mass and elite support for liberalization and market-orientated
policies generally and produce incremental (if not dramatic) enactments of a variety of neoliberal
economic and social policy reforms that lay the groundwork for a shift in the tax policy paradigm”
(Swank, 2006, p. 857). While we focus on the higher costs to left governments of tax reform, our
model is generalizable to cases where left governments are less likely to enact tax cuts than right
17For example, Laver and Hunt (1992) use questions on a party’s stance on tax policy as one of
the questions to place parties on a left-right continuum.
18The direct mechanism for inﬂuencing politics in both models are the political expenditures of
interest groups.
14governments, whether this is due to voters, interest groups, or other forms of costs.19 In sum,
governments attempt to attract capital through costly actions (tax reductions) but the costs for
these actions are higher for left governments.
This assumption on left governments being less likely to enact tax cuts also illustrates how
common exogenous shocks aﬀect tax policy. For example, in (Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004)
model an increase in the number of right governments in the world (an exogenous shock) increases
the “eﬀort” exerted by governments in cutting taxes. Yet their model still predicts that right
governments are more likely to reduce corporate taxes than left governments.20 This is an important
point for both our model and empirical analysis. Common shocks, such as a change in the mobility
of capital, can lead many or even all countries to cut corporate taxes. Yet we argue that a speciﬁc
pattern of partisan learning can be diﬀerentiated from both standard models of tax competition
and responses to common shocks.
This assumption also allows us to clearly diﬀerentiate our model from other models of corporate
tax competition. For example, (Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004) model and empirical analysis focus
on how competitive dynamics and domestic factors inﬂuence tax policy decisions. While partisan-
ship aﬀects the incentive to cut taxes, there is no theoretical argument or empirical test of how the
partisanship of other governments aﬀects tax diﬀusion. Competitive models focus on how tax cuts
by large countries, common competitors, or major senders of capital aﬀect a country’s incentives to
cut tax policy. The partisanship of a country cutting taxes should have no inﬂuence on tax compe-
tition. Yet our theory illustrates how tax cuts by left governments can reveal information about the
19Adding another dimension of political competition complicates this argument. Romer (1998)
ﬁnds that the left will moderate redistributive policies in the presence of a second (religious) di-
mension.
20Swank also argues that past control by right parties can aﬀect future tax reform, suggesting
that, “frequent government control by right-of-center parties in years preceding the proposal of
market-conforming tax policy reforms should facilitate adoption of those reforms” (Swank, 2006,
p. 857). Yet Swank also argues that government responses to the 1986 corporate tax reforms in
the U.S. are predicted to be partisan. Countries with right-leaning electorates and elites are more
likely to respond to this shock by enacting corporate tax reform.
15state of the world that leads other states to cut corporate taxes. This pattern of left governments
cutting taxes followed by other governments (left or right) is inconsistent with common exogenous
shocks or existing models of tax competition.
The somewhat counterintuitive conclusion here is that left governments lead the way on tax
cuts. Moreover, this model yields the following important empirical prediction: In line with the
standard logic of cascade/herding models, the larger the number of left governments cutting taxes,
the stronger the herding eﬀects, in that the dynamic is more diﬃcult to reverse (even if herding
is based on incorrect information). The underlying logic of this key empirical prediction will be
further developed in the following paragraphs where we outline the mathematical model.
The ineﬃcient use of information clearly is still an issue in this context. But in our two-level
social learning model in which domestic governments rely on biased advice, this seems to be far less
of a problem, since presumably the accuracy of the left government’s signal is higher than for the
average right government (the same logic applies to the Lohmann (1994) model).21 The combination
of the biased advisor story and the social learning model yields some interesting dynamics that we
are now going to explore in more detail.22
At the core of the model is the notion that governments are uncertain about the impact of
corporate tax cuts on investment. Speciﬁcally, national governments have incomplete information
about the elasticity of capital to taxes. If capital is inelastic to changes in the corporate tax rate,
then national governments do not have an incentive to cut taxes and might even consider raising
taxes. The reason for this type of scenario might be that investors are more concerned with existing
infrastructure, secure property rights and easy access to neighboring markets rather than the tax
rate. If, however, capital is highly elastic to taxes, then even small changes in the tax rate can
lead investors to locate in or migrate from a particular country. While governments might have a
general sense of the elasticity of capital to taxes, a substantial amount of uncertainty remains, not
least because investors are likely to carefully guard the information about their sensitivity to tax
21On signal accuracy, see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992).
22The social learning part of the model closely follows the standard cascade model developed in
Chamley (2004). However, as we explain below, we add several assumptions to the basic model to
make it conform to our theoretical story.
16rate changes.
In the model, there are two types of governments, right and left governments, who have to
decide whether to cut taxes or not, considering that capital elasticity to taxes is either higher or
unchanged. When θ, the state of nature indicating capital elasticity, is equal to 1, then there has
been an increase in capital elasticity. When θ = 0, then capital elasticity is unchanged. Both types
of governments, left and right, have the opportunity, when called upon, to take action, by either
cuting the corporate tax rate, x = 1, or maintaining the current corporate tax rate, x = 0. The
order in which governments set policy is determined exogenously, and governments are ordered by
the periods in which they are called upon to act.23 Therefore, government t gets to decide on a
course of action in period t.
When governments are called upon to act, they receive a privately observed signal that provides
probabilistic information on the elasticity of capital. The core of this model, as with any social
learning model, concerns the evolution of beliefs about the state of nature. When it is an agent’s
turn to act, she/he combines, via Bayesian updating, the public knowledge about the probabilility
of increased capital elasticity, i.e. θ = 1, with her/his private knowledge, the source of which is
the government’s private signal. Speciﬁcally, in each period, the public belief is updated by the
following formula. Since there are only two possible states of nature, we follow the convention in
the literature and express the public belief, λ in Equation 1, as the loglikelihood ratio of the two
possible states of nature.






In words, this formula states that the public belief about capital elasticity at time t+1 is derived
by combining the public belief at time t and the information conveyed by the action of government
t in time period t. The updating of the public belief is one crucial place where we diverge from the
23In future iterations, we will allow for the possibility of strategic delay (e.g. Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998; Lohmann, 1994). Rather than having a pre-deﬁned sequence according
to which national governments act, that model would allow governments to strategically delay
decisions on tax policy to wait for more accurate information to become available. However, for
our current empirical analysis a more reﬁned model is not necessary.
17standard model in the literature. While the literature that we are familiar with would distinguish
governments only by their actions, i.e. tax cut or no tax cut, we introduce the idea that it might
matter what type of government - left or right - it was that took the action.24
It is important to stress that this process of learning is central to our story. As evidenced by
Equation 1, we model the updating of the public belief by observing the actions (i.e. tax policy)
of other actors (i.e. governments). The ratio νt is to be interpreted as the information conveyed
by the actions, speciﬁcally in terms of the probability of a particular state of nature given the
observed action. We show at the end of this section that, under some general conditions, tax cuts
by left governments lead to more favorable public beliefs about increases in capital elasticity than
is the case for tax cuts by right governments. It directly follows that the larger the number of left
governments cutting taxes, the stronger the public belief that capital elasticity has increased. The
simple intuition is that for public beliefs to change, i.e. learning to take place, left governments
have to reverse their traditional policy positions. There is little public information gained when
a right government, already predisposed to cutting taxes, enacts a tax cut. Yet, tax cuts by left
governments, who are normally loath to cut taxes, provide new information. The insight from
Equation 1 informs much of the rest of the paper and leads to testable implications that we address
in our empirical analysis.25
To illustrate the predictions of the formal model, we generate a set of simple simulations that
show the trajectory of public beliefs under diﬀerent scenarios. In the following paragraphs, we
discuss the process by which we generated the simulations and the corresponding output. The
24The only exception we know of is the Lohmann (1994) model discussed above. However, as
pointed out earlier, her understanding of the importance of type is quite diﬀerent.
25At this point, we assume away that actions are costly, and we avoid answering the question of
why governments decide to cut taxes or not. We invite the reader to consider the possibility that
arcane exogenous shocks trigger government action initially. With these simplifying assumptions,
our model, by way of Equation 1 and the assumptions introduced below, shows that clustered tax
cuts by left governments propel the public belief about increased capital elasticity more quickly
above an arbitrary threshold than clustered tax cuts by right governments. We further elaborate
on this ﬁnding in subsequent paragraphs.
18simulations are based on a model with ten governments, ﬁve of which are left governments and the
other ﬁve right governments (in the following paragraphs right governments are denoted by R and
left governments by L). In a ﬁrst step, we randomly generated the following sequence of those ten
governments.
(L1, R1, L2, L3, L4, R2, R3, R4, L5, R5)
We then set the loglikelihood ratio of the initial public belief, λ0, equal to zero, which corre-
sponds to a starting public belief of µ0 = 0.5. Stated diﬀerently, we assume that initially govern-
ments are completely uncertain about the eﬀect of taxes on capital investment. We also assume
the following updating probabilities: pL = 0.4, p0
L = 0.8, pC = 0.49 and p0
C = 0.51. Here pL
refers to the probability that a tax cut by a left government accurately reﬂects increased capital
elasticity, p0
L that a left tax cut does not accurately reﬂect changes in capital elastitcy, pC that a
right government’s tax cut happens in an environment of increasing capital elasticity and p0
C that
a right tax cut occurs despite unchanged capital elasticity. In words, we assume that (i) a left
government that cuts taxes provides a fairly accurate signal that capital elasticity has increased
and is unlikely to be associated with constant capital elasticity, and (ii) that the actions of right
governments fail to provide accurate information about capital elasticity.
We then used Equation 1 to calculate the evolution of public beliefs under diﬀerent scenarios.
The lighter lines in the ﬁve panels of Figure 1 show the evolution of beliefs for the sequence (L1,
R1, L2, L3, L4, R2, R3, R4, L5, R5). Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst panel (lighter line), it is assumed that
only R1 cuts taxes (c on the x-axis), with all of the other governments, both left and right, opting
not to cut taxes (n on the x-axis). In the second panel (again lighter line and going clockwise), R1
and R2 are the only governments to cut taxes. This pattern continues until, in the ﬁfth panel, all
right governments are assumed to cut taxes, but none of the left governments.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Next, we took the sequence (L1, R1, L2, L3, L4, R2, R3, R4, L5, R5) and replaced the right
governments with left governments and vice versa to generate the following sequence, before in-
creasing the number of left governments cutting taxes from one (ﬁrst panel, dark line) to ﬁve (ﬁfth
panel, dark line).
19(R1, L1, R2, R3, R4, L2, L3, L4, R5, L5)
Comparing the dark and lighter lines, we can see that increasing the number of right govern-
ments cutting taxes (lighter lines) only minimally increases the public belief that capital is elastic
(from 0.027 in the ﬁrst panel to 0.037 in the last panel). However, increasing the number of left
governments cutting taxes (dark lines) greatly increases the public belief that capital is elastic
(from 0.13 in the ﬁrst panel to 0.99 in the last panel). Given that the public belief is a crucial
aspect of governmental policy-making in our model, these simulations provide clear evidence that
the more left governments cut taxes, the more likely it is that other governments will be convinced
to cut taxes themselves. While there is also an upward trend in the public beliefs as more right
governments cut taxes, the eﬀect is fairly limited and pales in comparison to the eﬀect of tax cuts
by left governments. Consequently, the key hypotheses that we are going to empirically test in
subsequent sections are:
H1: The more left governments cut taxes, the more likely other governments, both
left and right, are to cut their own tax rates.
H2: The number of right governments cutting taxes has no eﬀect on tax policy
decisions of other governments, both left and right.
There are some additional hypotheses that emerge from our model. While we do not empirically
test those additional hypotheses, we brieﬂy mention them here for the sake of completeness. First,
no tax cuts by right governments, while not conveying a substantial amount of information about
capital elasticity, lead to a slight decrease in the beliefs that tax cuts are conducive to attracting
foreign capital. Second, just like left governments lead the way on tax cuts, right governments
should lead the way on tax increases. Here, however, we are primarily concerned with the issue of
tax cuts, not least because of the rare occurrence of tax increases. Finally, while tax cuts by left
governments can, as shown, create momentum and trigger world-wide tax cuts, policy abandonment
by left governments, i.e. when a left government breaks the chain - instead of following other left
governments in cutting taxes, it stays put, choosing to maintain the current rate - can halt the
momentum. To what extent policy abandonment changes the momentum depends both on the
number of previous left governments that have cut taxes and the number of governments abandoning
tax cuts subsequently.
20One limitation of most existing empirical studies on learning and competition is that the pres-
ence of common shocks can complicate statistical identiﬁcation. In the context of corporate tax
policy, countries may cut taxes at the same time, suggesting competition or learning, when, in fact,
tax cuts could be driven by a common exogenous shock. For example, a decrease in the world
supply of foreign direct investment (i.e. a recession in the countries with the most outbound FDI)
could lead all governments to change tax policy. These decisions could be entirely determined by
the changing supply of FDI, yet the resulting pattern of simultaneous tax changes would be diﬃcult
to diﬀerentiate from competition or emulation.
Our model and empirical analysis can address this issue of common shocks. First, our theory
directly models public beliefs about taxation and explores changes in these public beliefs. An
exogenous change that is common knowledge to all countries would directly aﬀect the public beliefs.
Yet, our key assumption, a prominent one in much of the political economy literature, is that right
governments are more likely to reduce corporate taxes than left governments. Common shocks
would not produce a pattern of left governments leading the way in tax cuts, followed by all other
governments. Thus our two hypotheses are inconsistent with arguments about common shocks
driving tax policy. We also directly address this issue of common shocks in our empirical analysis
within a hierarchical (or multi-level) modeling framework.
In the next section, we empirically test our theoretical learning model. We also consider various
hypotheses associated with models of tax competition, in an attempt to isolate learning eﬀects from
competitive dynamics.
3 Learning or Competition: Data and Methods
Following Hypothesis 1 and 2, we explicitly test for partisan diﬀerences in learning by introducing
measures of tax cuts by both left and right governments. Thus, our interest is in exploring whether
tax cuts by right or left governments trigger tax cuts by other governments. We hypothesize, in
accordance with the predictions generated at the end of Section 2, that learning takes place when
left governments cut taxes. We stress that this pattern of diﬀusion is inconsistent with existing
arguments about tax policy competition.
Our research design strategy is to focus on corporate tax policy cuts in the OECD to test our
21theory.26 Although we control for a number of domestic-level factors that aﬀect corporate tax
policy, our focus is on exploring how tax policy cuts in other OECD countries inﬂuence a country’s
tax policy decisions.
In our theoretical model, we argue that a process of learning within an environment of imperfect
information can lead to temporally clustered tax policy cuts. Those patterns, however, are also
consistent with models of tax policy competition. Yet, there are observable implications of our
model that are distinct from the conventional wisdom of tax competition. Whereas models of tax
competition, such as Basinger and Hallerberg (2004), argue that governments should be especially
sensitive to tax policy cuts in competitor countries, we argue that learning can only take place
under a limited set of conditions.
For example, we argue that major corporate tax cuts in the United States and Britain under
Reagan and Thatcher could aﬀect worldwide patterns of FDI inﬂows. Yet, the partisanship of
these governments, both predisposed to lower corporate and personal income taxes, provides little
information on the relationship between FDI and tax policy. However, when a left government,
such as the Australian Labour government in 1987, implements considerable tax cuts, this provides
meaningful information to other governments (by way of the biased advisor assumption).
We use two data sets to test our theoretical model. The ﬁrst is the data set used by Basinger
and Hallerberg (2004) who take corporate tax rate changes as the dependent variable. While we
believe that these rate changes are important to multinationals making investment decisions, the
focus of most of the social science literature is on the tax policy reforms of governments. Despite
the fact that rate changes and policy reforms may seem equivalent, tax policy reforms are made
when the legislature passes a corresponding law, while rates changes occur when these rates are
applied to corporate taxes.27
26The OECD countries are Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada and Denmark.
27In terms of rate changes (Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) data) there are 39 tax cuts by right
governments and 14 by left governments during the study period. In terms of law changes (our
own data), there are 29 right cuts and 11 left cuts.
22Using a number of data sources, we searched for announced tax policy reforms in our sample
of OECD countries from 1980-2000.28 We provide details on the data coding in a supplemental
appendix and include the data and replication materials on our websites. We coded major tax
policy cuts as announced cuts to the maximum statutory marginal corporate tax rate. While this
may miss a number of other potential tax policy cuts, such as changes in depreciation schedules,
most of the major tax policy reforms in the OECD have been coupled with reductions in the
statutory tax rate. We argue that the actual reforms are the signals that other countries observe.
Thus, we diﬀerentiate between the yearly change in the tax rate and policy change.
Are we splitting hairs? A number of contemporary examples of tax policy cuts help to motivate
this new data set. In many cases, governments pass a single law that aﬀects corporate tax rates,
yet the year that it is applied varies. Austria’s 2004 tax reform proposed lowering corporate tax
rates from 34% to 25%, taking eﬀect in 2005. Thus, the policy reform was enacted in 2004, and
the rate change became eﬀective in 2005. In contrast, Ireland passed a corporate tax reform in
December of 1997 that increased corporate tax rates from 10% to 12.5%, yet the change did not
go into eﬀect until 2003. Other countries, such as Canada, have recently (and historically) passed
tax policy reforms where rate changes are phased in over a period of years. Perhaps the largest
corporate tax reform in Canada’s history was introduced in 2000, phasing in corporate tax rate
reductions over ﬁve years. Thus, a single tax policy reform is associated with ﬁve tax rate changes.
In these cases, if one assumed that tax reforms were passed the year before a tax rate change came
into eﬀect (a rate change in say 1985 is assumed to have been passed through a tax reform in 1984),
this would lead to a correct classiﬁcation of the Austrian cut, an incorrect coding of the Irish tax
reform (coding the reform as having occurred in 2002 when, in fact, the law was passed in 1997)
and multiple incorrect codings of the Canadian tax cut (rather than one law change in 2000, one
would code ﬁve legislative changes). Thus there are major diﬀerences between when a tax rate
comes into eﬀect and when a tax policy reform is passed.
In Table 1 we present the descriptive data on the timing of tax policy cuts that we coded and
observed rate changes from the Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) data set. We compare years in
28These include Lexis-Nexis searches of major English language newspapers and data from Pech-
man (1988), Boskin and McLure, Jr. (1990), Hauﬂer (2001) and OECD (2004).
23which there is a change in the rate of corporate taxation (coded as 1 if there is a reduction in
the central tax rate, 0 otherwise) using data from Basinger and Hallerberg and years of statutory
corporate tax reform (coded as 1 if a law was passed to reduce statutory rates and 0 otherwise)
as coded by the authors.29 To be clear, if a country has a rate change from say 45% in year t to
40% in year t + 1 in the Basinger and Hallerberg data, we code this as a tax rate change in year
t + 1. For our own data, we code tax policy cuts when major pieces of tax legislation are passed
(as explained above). For example, Finland’s decision in May 1988 for a package of corporate tax
reductions over a series of years is coded as a tax policy cut in 1988.
[Table 1 about here.]
Of the 360 total cases in the data set, there are a total of 295 agreements in coding and 65
cases of disagreement. This error rate of 18% is not only high by most data coding standards,
but it is striking in that the cases of agreement are mostly due to the rarity of tax policy cuts.
In 284 cases, both data sets ﬁnd no evidence of tax policy cuts. Although less extreme than war
or democratization, tax policy cuts are pretty rare events. In all three cases, coding a data set of
all zeros would yield fairly low overall error rates. In our case, a data set of all zeros (no policy
change) would be more accurate than the policy changes implied by the Basinger and Hallerberg
(2004) rate changes (89% vs. 83% accuracy).
Comparing our data on observed tax policy cuts and tax rate changes, there are only 14 cases
of agreement (3.9% of the cases). We ﬁnd 39 cases of Type I error, where the rate change data
indicates tax policy cuts, yet we ﬁnd no evidence of an actual tax law being enacted. We also
ﬁnd 26 cases of Type II error, where our data indicates a major tax policy reform, yet there is no
rate change in the Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) data set. Put another way, in the Basinger and
Hallerberg data, roughly 15% of the observations are tax policy cuts. In our data we ﬁnd evidence
of tax cuts in only 11% of the observations, with little overlap with their data.
Within this sea of numbers on the coding accuracy, we believe that one set of descriptive
statistics tells most of the story. Of the 53 tax rate changes in the Basinger and Hallerberg (2004)
data, 73% of the cases are not associated with an actual tax policy reform. One may quibble that
these errors could be associated with assuming that a tax rate cut in year t, say 1990, should be
29We ﬁnd similar results using the general as opposed to the central tax rate.
24associated with a tax policy cut in year t (also 1990). But what if we assumed that a rate change
in t (1990) was associated with a tax policy cut in t − 1 (1989)? Using rate changes in year t and
assuming that these were caused by legislative change in year t − 1, we still ﬁnd very high error
rates of over 16% and only 16 cases of correctly coded tax policy reform. To put it bluntly, no
matter what lag structure one uses, if one assumed that a single tax rate change was associated
with a single tax policy reform, one would be wrong 70% of the time!
It is important to stress that we do not dispute the quality of the underlying tax data used
by Basinger and Hallerberg (2004). Theirs is high-quality data that has been used by numerous
scholars, and it provides important information on the rates of corporate taxation faced by ﬁrms
operating in a particular country in a given year.30 In our empirical analysis we use both sets of
data, yet we stress that if one is seeking to explain tax policy choice by governments, changes in
corporate tax rates are not only rough estimates of when policy is enacted, but these estimates will
tend to be wrong. In models of learning and competition that make arguments about temporal
patterns, we believe that identifying the date of the change is necessary to assure accuracy of the
empirical analysis.
In our empirical analysis we rely on two types of models. In the ﬁrst set of models we estimate
the determinants of tax rate changes. We replicate the work of Basinger and Hallerberg (2004),
using a standard OLS model with panel-corrected standard errors. Our dependent variable is the
change in the corporate tax rate (Change in Central Tax Rate). Our key independent variable
is our constructed measure of corporate tax policy cuts in the n − 1 other countries (World Tax
30One other important distinction is that we are focusing on the maximum statutory marginal
corporate tax rate. We argue that this rate serves as a clear signal of tax policy changes and is
easily observed by other governments. Of course, other forms of national income, sales and value-
added taxation, along with subnational taxation (at the state and local level), can aﬀect ﬁrms’
investment decisions. Basinger and Hallerberg (2004), for example, study tax competition using
three diﬀerent types of taxation that aﬀect investment decisions. Again, we believe their data is an
excellent source for exploring the tax burden and investment decisions of ﬁrms. However, since our
focus is on tax policy learning across governments, the maximum statutory marginal corporate tax
rate, being the most visible tax policy instrument, is the most appropriate measure in this context.
25Law Changes).31 We believe these models provide an excellent comparison to existing work on the
political economy of corporate tax policy. The model takes the following form.
∆(t,t−1)centralrateij = Xijβ + Zjζ + ij, for i = 1,...,299 and j = 1,...,20
In the second set of models we focus solely on our data collected on tax policy cuts and do not
use data on tax rates. We estimate the probability of tax law changes in two standard time-series
cross-sectional logit models of the following form.
Pr(taxlawcuti) = logit−1(Xiβ), for i = 1,...,299
We also estimate a hierarchical model (also referred to as multi-level or mixed-eﬀect model),
in which we allow the intercept to randomly vary across countries. We believe that a hierarchical
model is the most appropriate one in this context, given (i) the hierarchical structure of our data
and (ii) the built-in ability of this model to test for rather than assume the degree of country-level
variance beyond that accounted for by the ﬁxed eﬀects.
Pr(taxlawcuti) = logit−1(αj[i] + Xiβ), for i = 1,...,299
αj ∼ N(µα,σ2
country), for j = 1,...,20
The key independent variables are the government’s partisanship (Partisanship) as measured
by Laver and Hunt (1992) and coded by Tsebelis and the ideological distance between veto players
(Ideological Distance).32 Partisanship is coded on a 0-1 continuum, where left governments (coded
as 0) are more likely to resist corporate tax cuts due to the higher domestic costs associated with
this policy change. Ideological Distance is the distance between veto players, where governments
31Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) estimated the impact of tax competition on three diﬀerent tax
rates (eﬀective, general and central). Since our paper focuses on statutory corporate tax policy
reforms that are enacted by the central government, we use the central rate for the empirical
analysis.
32http://sitemaker.umich.edu/tsebelis/veto players data.
26with large ideological distances between veto players will have diﬃculty passing tax policy reforms.
Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) also include the past corporate tax rate [Tax Rate (t − 1)], where
countries with higher rates are more likely to respond to tax policy competition. They also use a
number of other control variables, including Capital Controls, Inﬂation Rate and economic Growth
Rate, all of which are lagged by one year. We provide details on these variables in the Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) also use a number of weights to generate variables representing
the international environment. These include averages for the rest of the world of capital controls,
ideological distance and changes in capital taxation in competitor countries. In this replication we
take the simple weight of the n − 1 countries in the world, where for a country (say Germany)
Capital Controls (World), Ideological Distance (World), and Competitor Taxation Change are the
mean values of the other 19 OECD countries.33 Competitor Taxation Change is the key variable
measuring competition.
Our empirical analysis only examines the impact of observing tax cuts in other countries, and
not the size of the tax cuts. Incorporating the size of the tax cuts into our empirical analysis would
require additional assumptions, such as how to code tax cuts that are phased in over a series of
years. More importantly, our current theoretical model neither provides predictions on how the size
of tax cuts aﬀects learning nor how the size of tax cuts is related to partisanship (e.g., how large
tax cuts by right governments aﬀect learning relative to smaller tax cuts by left governments). In
order to minimize the number of assumptions required for our data coding and to conduct the most
direct test of our theoretical model, we do not examine how the size of tax cuts aﬀects learning.
4 Learning from the Left: Empirical Evidence
We present the empirical results from the replication of Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) in Model 1
of Table 3.34 We also test Basinger and Hallerberg’s model of tax rate change by substituting their
33In their paper, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) estimate a number of weights on these variables,
including weighting by GDP and levels of capital ﬂows.
34The OLS models with panel-corrected standard errors were estimated using xtpcse command
in Stata. We thank Mark Hallerberg and Scott Basinger for sharing their Stata do ﬁles with us.
27variable for tax competition, Competitor Taxation Change, with our own measure of tax policy
cuts. Our measure, World Tax Law Changes, is the number of tax policy cuts in the other n − 1
countries in year t−1. The intuition for both models is that countries are responding to tax policy
cuts in other countries.35 We expect the coeﬃcient on World Tax Law, Right Tax Law and Left
Tax Law Changes to be positive since tax policy cuts are coded as 1 and no tax policy cuts are
coded as 0. In both models tax rate changes and tax policy cuts are associated with tax cuts.
Our control variables are in line with conventional work on the determinants of tax policy
cuts. We are more likely to observe tax cuts in years when other countries have low levels of
restrictions on ﬂows of international capital. Also, high tax countries and countries with high levels
of inﬂation are more likely to reform corporate taxes. Model 1 in Table 3 replicates the work
of Basinger and Hallerberg (2004), using the average corporate tax rate reduction of the n − 1
other countries (Competitor Taxation Change) as the independent variable, and Model 2 uses our
variable counting the number of tax policy reforms in the n − 1 other countries (World Tax Law
Changes). Both models show that tax changes, whether measured as rate reductions or tax policy
cuts, are associated with rate reductions in other countries.
[Table 3 about here.]
In Model 3 we diﬀerentiate between tax policy cuts by left governments and right governments.
Similar to Model 2, we include counts of the number of tax policy cuts by right governments, Right
Tax Law Changes, and the number of tax policy cuts by left governments, Left Tax Law Changes.36
The results from this model indicate that tax policy cuts are driven by the tax policy cuts of left
governments. The negative coeﬃcient on Left Tax Law Changes indicates that a tax policy cut by
a left government leads to a reduction in the corporate tax rates of the n − 1 other countries. Our
For the regular logit model, the hierarchical logit model and the post-estimation results presented
in Figure 2 we used the Zelig package (Bailey and Alimadhi, 2007; Imai, King and Lau, 2007a,b,
2008) in R (R Development Core Team, 2009).
35The coeﬃcient of Competitor Taxation Change is positive since tax policy cuts in other countries
are coded as negative changes (a reduction from 40% to 30% is coded as −10%).
36We code governments ≤ 0.5 on the partisanship measure as left and > 0.5 as right.
28results are robust to changes in the lag structure. Finally, when we do not separate left and right
governments using a dichotomous classiﬁcation and instead weight the tax law changes by the level
of partisanship we ﬁnd strong evidence that tax law changes by left governments (the change in
the tax rate weighted by partisanship) lead to tax reductions, while we do not ﬁnd evidence that
large policy changes by right governments lead to tax cuts in other countries.37 We interpret these
results as providing strong support for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
One potential criticism of our empirical analysis is that “left governments” cutting taxes may be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from “right governments” choosing to cut taxes. For example, while most left
governments are loath to cut corporate taxes, a small set of left governments may see themselves
as very competitive in attracting FDI. Thus, our coding of left tax policy cuts could be proxying
for eﬀectiveness in attracting international capital.
We explored if there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences between country-years when left governments
enact tax reforms and (i) the rest of the country-years in the sample, and (ii) and right governments
that cut taxes. We examined if there were statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the amount of
capital attracted by these governments (foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP), the
size of the domestic market (log of GDP) and the country’s level of development (log of GDP per
capita).38 All of these factors are associated with being a more attractive investment environment.
We found no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between left governments cutting taxes and the rest
of the governments in the sample, or between left governments cutting taxes and right governments
cutting taxes. We are conﬁdent that our variable counting the number of left governments cutting
taxes is not proxying for competitive governments cutting taxes.
[Table 4 about here.]
In Table 4 we present the results of two logit models using the passage of a tax policy cuts
as the dependent variable. In Models 4 and 5 we present a logit of tax policy cuts with country
37The level of partisanship is a continuous variable from 0 (left) to 1 (right). We weight left tax
cuts by the formula ((1-partisanship) × tax law change) and right tax cuts by (partisanship × tax
law change).
38All data is from the World Bank (2004).
29dummy variables.39 Note that the coeﬃcient on Left Tax Law Changes were negative in Table 4
(cuts by left governments lead to reductions in tax rates) while in this set of regressions we expect
a positive coeﬃcient. We expect corporate tax policy cuts in left countries to positively aﬀect other
countries’ propensity to enact tax policy cuts.
The ﬁrst model controls for the country-level factors from Table 3. As in Models 2 and 3, we
include a count of tax policy cuts in the n − 1 other countries (World Tax Law Changes, Model
4) and the number of tax policy laws passed by both left and right governments (Left Tax Law
Changes and Right Tax Law Changes, Model 5). While these regressions use the same set of control
variables as the previous OLS regressions, many of the control variables are no longer statistically
signiﬁcant. We believe that one reason for this is that the limited amount of real tax policy reforms
(11% of the observations) makes estimation diﬃcult. Yet, we note that our key empirical results on
social learning from left governments is robust to diﬀerent empirical speciﬁcations.40 As in Table
3, we ﬁnd that while World Tax Law Changes has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the tax policy decisions of governments, these results are entirely driven by the tax policy decisions
of left governments.
We have examined the robustness of these results under a number of alternative speciﬁcations.
One important concern is the issue of temporal dependence where observations of tax cuts at time
t may not be independent of tax cuts made in pervious years. Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998)
provide a methodology to deal with these issues of duration dependence in panel models with
binary dependent variables. Following Beck, Katz and Tucker, we estimate Models 4 and 5 by
including a count of the years since the last tax cut and three smoothing splines.41 Our results on
the relationship between left tax cuts and learning are robust and our results indicate that duration
39The empirical results without the country dummies are similar.
40Given the large number of zeros in the dependent variable we also estimated rare events logit
models (see King and Zeng, 1999a,b). Software used to calculate the rare events logistic regression
is from Tomz, King and Zeng (1999). Our empirical results are similar. We will make the results
available upon request.
41We use the btscs ado ﬁle made available Beck, Katz and Tucker. Results are available from
the authors.
30dependence is not an issue in our data.42
A second set of robustness tests examines if our results are driven by omitted variable bias.
Our empirical analysis is built upon the speciﬁcation of Basinger and Hallerberg (2004). Other
inﬂuential articles cited in this paper, including Hays (2003), Swank and Steimo (2002) and Swank
(2006), include additional control variables. We test the robustness of Models 4 and 5 by including
measures of unemployment, levels of trade, the level of foreign direct investment and the government
budget balance.43 Our core empirical results are unchanged.
A third robustness test builds on the work of Hays (2003) and Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano
(2008). Both argue that the existence of capital controls mediate tax competition. According to
these models of tax competition, a government is likely to respond to tax cuts by other governments
when capital controls are present. We test the interactive eﬀect of capital controls and both the
overall number of tax cuts and the number of tax cuts by right and left governments. We ﬁnd that
capital controls have no independent or mediating eﬀect on responding to other countries’ tax cuts.
Thus, we are even more conﬁdent that our empirical results are capturing learned eﬀects and not
those of tax competition.
Finally, we estimate a hierarchical logit model, in which we regress tax policy cuts on the
independent variables described earlier. The hierarchical model does not include country dummies.
Rather, country-level variance is accounted for by including a random intercept.44 The results are
given in Table 4, Model 6.
The results conﬁrm our theoretical predictions. Left Tax Law Changes is positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant, while Right Tax Law Changes is not statistically signiﬁcant. The lagged tax
rate, Tax Rate (t − 1), is again positive and marginally statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that
countries with higher tax rates are more likely to cut taxes than countries with already low tax
42Neither the splines nor the count of years since the last tax cut are statistically signiﬁcant. In
our data we have cases of countries that never enact legislation that reduces corporate taxes and
some cases of countries that engage in back-to-back tax law changes.
43All data is from World Bank (2004). Results available from the authors.
44In mixed-eﬀects models, all of the variables except for the random eﬀects are referred to as
ﬁxed eﬀects.
31rates. The standard deviation of the country-level errors (SD RE Error in Table 4) is very small,
indicating that there is very little variation across countries beyond what is accounted for by the
ﬁxed eﬀects.45 This indicates that there is quite a large degree of pooling, suggesting that it is not
necessary to include country ﬁxed eﬀects.46
One potential criticism of our empirical analysis is that common shocks can cause tax policy
changes that are observationally equivalent to competition or learning. One empirical solution is
to include year dummy variables, thus accounting for factors that make it more likely to observe
tax cuts in speciﬁc years. Unfortunately this solution is both atheoretical and also does not allow
for a diﬀerentiation between common shocks, learning, or competition the very purpose of this
project. Scholars have identiﬁed that certain years are associated with more tax cuts than others.
The key question is which theoretical mechanism accounts for this diﬀusion. While we argue that
our observed pattern of left governments cutting taxes and other governments following is incon-
sistent with common shocks, we also include one ﬁnal robustness test to deal with the alternative
explanation that common shocks account for temporally clustered tax policy changes.
Common shocks come in a number of diﬀerent forms, from natural disasters to global recessions.
Yet the key mechanism linking shocks to economic policy reform in general, and to domestic tax
policy change in particular, is their eﬀect on domestic economic outcomes. For example, global
recessions become politically salient when these recessions lead to reductions in trade ﬂows or
increasing levels of unemployment. To paraphrase Rodden and Rose-Ackerman (1997), politicians
only respond to market pressures when these market pressures translate into electoral pressures.
Thus, accounting for common shocks does not require controlling for every possible type of shock.
45By dividing the standard deviation of the country-level errors by 4, one gets ± the percent by
which countries diﬀer on the probability scale beyond the diﬀerences explained by the ﬁxed eﬀects
(Gelman and Hill, 2007, p. 304). In the Model 6, that number is ≈ ± 0%. This supports the
argument that, given strong globalization eﬀects, countries, aside from diﬀerences in their formal
political processes, tend to be very similar in the area of tax policy making.
46We also estimated a generalized linear mixed model using maximum likelihood (Zelig uses
penalized quasi-likelihood). The substantive results are the same across the models. We will make
the results available upon request.
32It only requires us to examine the channels through which these shocks aﬀect politicians’ tax policy
calculus. Consequently, we use ﬁrst diﬀerences of the full battery of economic control variables -
changes in economic growth, inﬂation, unemployment, trade, foreign direct investment and budget
deﬁcits.47 Even with this battery of economic controls, we ﬁnd that tax cuts by left governments
lead to other countries cutting corporate taxes.
The substantive impact of tax policy cuts by left governments is quite large. In Figure 2, we
present post-estimation results generated with the R package Zelig. Speciﬁcally, Figure 2 shows
the impact a tax policy cut by a left government has on countries’ probabilities to institute tax
policy cuts. For the simulations, on which the results in Figure 2 are based, we set all of the
variables, except for Right Tax Law Changes and Left Tax Law Changes, at their means. The solid
line in Figure 2 represents a situation in which neither a left nor a right government changes its
tax laws.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In our sample of OECD tax policy cuts, only 11% of the country-year observations are tax
policy cuts. From our simulations, we ﬁnd that the impact of this one tax law change by a left
government is quite substantial. During years when there were no tax law changes in the previous
year, the expected probability of a tax law change is 8%. When a single left government chooses
to cut tax policy in year t, the probability of each individual country implementing a tax policy
cut in year t+1 jumps to 14%, an increase of 75%. While major tax policy cuts are still relatively
uncommon, we ﬁnd considerable evidence of learning consistent with our theory.
5 The Importance of Learning from Others
Taxation constitutes one of the most important areas of government decision making and is also
one of the most hotly contested issues in domestic political debate. Yet, despite its prominance
in domestic political debate, there still seems to be a lot of confusion surrounding the politics of
taxation. Scholars have shown that much of the conventional wisdom on the politics of taxation is
misleading. For example, while election campaigns around the world are still fought on the basis of
47We test diﬀerent speciﬁcations of how one-year shocks to these economic variables aﬀect tax
policy reform. The results are available from the authors.
33“tax and spend” versus “small government,” campaign rhetoric - maybe unsurprisingly - does not
accurately reﬂect the complexities of ﬁscal policy making in a globalized world. The idea that left
governments always look to raise taxes and right governments to cut taxes is a gross simpliﬁcation.
At the other extreme is the view that global competition for capital has lead to a race to
the bottom, especially with respect to corporate tax rates. Empirical evidence, however, has
consistently shown that a race to the bottom is not taking place, questioning the alleged zero-
sum nature of corporate tax policy making. Moreover, research has highlighted the importance of
national circumstances and domestic political inﬂuences, further contradicting the pure competitive
dynamics suggested by the race to the bottom story. Yet, a pure domestic politics view of taxation is
equally misleading. Frequently, this approach treats domestic politics as a dam that holds back the
forces of globalization, with domestic politics trumping global market forces. In this paper, we oﬀer
a very diﬀerent account of the politics of taxation. In fact, we argue that domestic politics might be
the driving force behind international diﬀusion of tax policies, which suggests that domestic politics
and common global trends are not incompatible but integral and coexistent parts of international
diﬀusion.
Our main contribution is to show how (domestic) partisan politics and globalization can be re-
inforcing, where government biases can provide opportunities for learning. For corporate tax policy
in particular, this means that corporate tax cuts by left governments provide important signals to
governments around the world about the viability of tax cuts. The underlying argument is based
purely on dynamics of learning. Since left governments tend to be the most resistant to tax cuts,
policy shifts by those governments toward lower taxation conveys important information to other
governments. The result is diﬀusion of tax policy changes, not through coercion or competition,
but through learning.
Our theoretical insights and research design strategy have applications beyond corporate taxa-
tion. Within the international political economy literature, scholars have identiﬁed waves of policy
changes, such as shifts away from state owned ﬁrms, declines in the use of import substitution
policies and a rise of facilitating exports as an economic development strategy. These changes are
not necessarily permanent. While the expropriation of foreign direct investment was thought to
have ended in the 1980s, it has reared its ugly head again in recent years. Explaining these waves
of policy choices constitutes one of the most important challenges in political science. We hope
34that our work can help push towards theory building and empirical analysis that explores these
dynamics.
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42No Change in Policy Change in Policy Total
No Rate Change 281 26 307
Rate Change 39 14 53
Total 320 40 360
Table 1: Comparison of Tax Policy Cuts and Changes in Tax
Rates.
Notes: Columns represent classiﬁcation according to our cod-
ing of tax policy cuts. Rows represent coding based on
Basinger and Hallerberg (2004).
43Variable Mean SD Min Max Description
Change in Central −0.644 3.263 −25 20 Change in the central
Tax Rate statutory corporate tax rate
Partisanship 0.554 0.152 0.211 0.86 Partisanship, where 0 represents left,
1 represents right
Capital Controls 0.105 0.157 0 0.75 0 represents full
capital mobility
Ideological Distance 0.178 0.170 0 0.62 Ideological distance between
veto players
Competitor Tax Rate −0.621 0.996 −2.89 1.24 Average of the (n − 1) other
Change countries’ corporate tax rate changes
Tax Rate (t − 1) 39.06 8.100 19 56 Lagged central statutory corporate
tax rate
Growth (t − 1) 2.296 2.074 −7.1 10.7 Lagged rate of economic growth
Inﬂation (t − 1) 6.348 13.492 −0.8 215.7 Lagged rate of inﬂation
Table 2: Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) Data.
44Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Partisanship −3.021† −2.504 −2.896†
(1.703) (1.651) (1.705)
Partisanship 0.136 8.145 1.535
(World) (7.339) (8.878) (8.308)
Capital Controls 0.143 0.169 0.282
(1.729) (1.683) (1.734)
Capital Controls 14.403∗∗ 13.843∗∗ 13.927∗∗
(World) (3.860) (3.949) (3.982)
Ideological Distance 0.095 0.498 0.385
(1.489) (1.508) (1.491)
Ideological Distance −7.591 −1.310 −0.625
(World) (6.844) (8.469) (8.661)
Tax Rate (t − 1) −0.265∗∗ −0.264∗∗ −0.257∗∗
(0.064) (0.063) (0.064)
Growth Rate (t − 1) −0.103 −0.090 −0.132
(0.084) (0.086) (0.083)




World Tax Law −0.256∗∗
Changes (0.075)
Right Tax Law 0.005
Changes (0.143)
Left Tax Law −0.706∗∗
Changes (0.224)
Constant 11.115∗ 5.572 8.918†
(4.772) (5.734) (5.592)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 299 299 299
R2 0.28 0.29 0.28
Table 3: OLS Models of Tax Rates Changes.
Notes: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Public Beliefs.
Note: Dark lines represent the evolution of public beliefs for
left tax cuts, lighter lines represent public beliefs for right tax
cuts. i represents the starting value of the public belief (0.5),
n are cases of no tax cuts, c are cases of tax cuts.

















Figure 2: Marginal Impact of Left Tax Policy Cuts on the
Probability of Tax Policy Cuts.
Note: The ﬁgure is based on simulations done in the R pack-
age Zelig. The curves present Gaussian density estimates,
smoothed at twice the default level. For the solid line, all
of the variables are set at their means and Left Tax Law
Changes and Right Tax Law Changes are set at zero. For
the dotted line, the Left Tax Law Changes variable was in-
creased to 1, while all of the remaining variables maintained
their values.
47Variable Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Partisanship 2.304 2.386 1.081
(2.096) (2.141) (1.432)
Partisanship −3.620 1.539 3.897
(World) (11.796) (11.157) (10.380)
Capital Controls 0.802 0.919 −1.430
(2.632) (2.667) (1.656)
Capital Controls −1.085 −0.871 −1.654
(World) (4.609) (4.674) (4.130)
Ideological Distance −2.652 −2.716 −2.082
(1.986) (2.028) (1.304)
Ideological Distance −11.103 −15.371 −14.380
(World) (10.216) (10.572) (9.909)
Tax Rate (t − 1) 0.024 0.016 0.048†
(0.043) (0.044) (0.029)
Growth Rate (t − 1) −0.002 0.022 −0.011
(0.109) (0.108) (0.100)
Inﬂation Rate (t − 1) 0.025 0.025 0.015
(0.030) (0.030) (0.015)
World Tax Law 0.151† –
Changes (0.087) –
Right Tax Law −0.231 −0.157
Changes (0.189) (0.171)
Left Tax Law 0.735∗ 0.558∗
Changes (0.307) (0.274)
Constant −-2.791 −4.657 −3.935
(7.626) (7.275) (6.808)
Country-Level SD (ML) ≈ 0
Country Dummies Yes Yes No
N 299 299 299
AIC 227.3 226.4 218.0
Table 4: Logit Models of Tax Law Change.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Country-Level SD
refers to the standard deviation of the country-level error
in the hierarchical model. AIC stands for the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion. Loosely speaking, the lower the AIC the
better the model ﬁt.
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%.
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